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Abstract: We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their 
conclusions but we differ on some of their definitions and terms. Affects (emotional feelings) 
should be part of sentience. Although the evidence presented for insect sentience is strong, we 
list some of the counterevidence that should be considered. Our own research supports M&P’s 
choice of arthropods, cephalopods, and vertebrates as the only sentient organisms with moral 
status.   
 
Jon Mallatt, Clinical Associate Professor, WWAMI 
Medical Education Program, University of Idaho, does 
research on the origin of the major animal groups, 
especially vertebrates, and on the evolution and nature 
of consciousness. Website 
 
 
Todd E. Feinberg, Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and 
Neurology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai 
does research on how the neurobiology of the brain 
creates consciousness and the individual’s sense of 
identity. Website   
 
 
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) make a good argument that, for consistency, the same 
standards should be used to judge sentience and moral worth in vertebrates and invertebrates. 
Also valuable is how M&P assemble a large amount of literature on invertebrate (mostly insect) 
sentience and cognition. We especially appreciate their pointing out that a capacity for pain is 
used too often as the sole standard for judging whether an animal is sentient, when many other 
affective states are possible (e.g., stress, starvation, pleasure) and should all be considered. Two 
of the commentaries to date, however, have centered on pain despite M&P’s plea against it 
(Elwood, 2020; Veit & Huebner, 2020). Although we agree with many of M&P’s proposals and 
conclusions, we suggest that some of their positions should be further clarified.  
  
1. Terminology and definitions. M&P do not always make it clear on what basis they judge an 
animal to deserve moral status. In various places in the target article, the basis is said to be having 
mental states, cognition, sentience, cognition plus sentience, flexible behaviors, or affective 
states along with cognition. Most of these traits overlap, but some are fairly distinct (e.g., 
sentience and cognition), so it is difficult to know what the authors mean. Later in the text, 
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however, they definitively settle on sentience as their basis for moral status, eliminating cognition 
because computers have cognitive functions. Sentience is the correct choice, and most of the 
other commentators understood that M&P were using it (Balcombe, 2020; Browning and Veit, 
2020; Cammaerts, 2020; Elwood, 2020; Figdor, 2020; Levy, 2020; Soryl, 2020). We just wish M&P 
had established their sentience standard at the start of the target article.  
Many different terms besides “sentience” are used to designate the most basic, minimal 
form of “consciousness” (yet another term). M&P sometimes use these multiple terms in 
confusing ways. Table 1 is our version of the best usage, developed from our work on 
consciousness (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2018, 2019, 2020). Most other sources agree with us, 
especially that the basic type is called phenomenal consciousness and that this includes both 
images and affects (Block, 1995; Mellor, 2019), but M&P do not.  
 







*We assume all affects are conscious. For another view, see Adolphs and Anderson (2018). 
 
A large part of the confusion comes from the way M&P use the term “phenomenal 
consciousness.” They point out that it is a difficult and controversial term. Then they say it is 
doubly “inadequate.” From this, the reader might infer that they are rejecting it; but instead of 
rejecting it, they use phenomenal consciousness repeatedly without explicitly stating what they 
take it to mean (although the context implies that what they mean is “being capable of 
experience”).  
What is going on here? The only thing that is clear is that M&P do not believe that 
phenomenal consciousness includes affect — that it is only a “precondition” for affect. According 
to other authors, however, when phenomenal consciousness is stripped of its philosophical 
complications, it includes experiencing affects as well as sensations (Block, 1995). Even 
Carruthers’s deeply philosophical and elaborated analysis (to which M&P refer) states that affect 
(valence) is in phenomenal consciousness (Carruthers, 2018, p. 676), not a separate thing that is 
glossed onto it, as M&P seem to think.  
We would accordingly recommend that M&P include affect in their definition of 
phenomenal consciousness. This will avoid errors and confusion; then they can say that 
phenomenal consciousness, sentience, and experiencing are all equivalent (Table 1) and that that 
is what imparts moral worth. M&P also use the key term “sentience” inconsistently. They first 
define it as the capacity for subjective experience, but later define it differently, as affect: 
 
"Phenomenal consciousness alone is not an adequate basis by which to establish the existence of 
a welfare ... if things are to matter to an organism, it must be capable of experiencing states of 
affairs as pleasurable or aversive.... We think this affective glossing of conscious experience is 
better captured by the term sentience." 
 
Sentience ≡ phenomenal consciousness ≡ having experiences 
and consists of two kinds of experiences: 
A. sensory experiences (including “images”) 
B. affective experiences (emotions and moods)* 
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The context of the target article indicates that M&P only believe in the first definition, but the 
inconsistency adds to the reader’s confusion. As M&P’s argument now stands, the semantics lead 
to a logical incoherence: Their current claims are that sentience is experience, that phenomenal 
consciousness is experience, that affects are different from phenomenal consciousness, and that 
sentience includes or even is affect. Sentience and phenomenal consciousness cannot both be 
experience if phenomenal consciousness excludes affect but sentience includes affect, as claimed. 
Again, the solution to this logical contradiction is to adopt the standard terminology of Table 1.  
 
2.  Counterevidence. Although M&P present considerable convincing evidence that insects have 
both sentience and sophisticated cognition and learning, they do not include the experimental 
evidence against these abilities. This counterevidence was presented in the article by Abramson 
& Wells (2018), “An inconvenient truth: Some neglected issues in invertebrate learning,” which 
M&P only cite in passing. Abramson & Wells report that the learning abilities of bees — 
neurobiologically and behaviorally among the most complex insects — are sometimes more 
specific and less flexible than those of vertebrates. Bees can become confused when either the 
spatial location or the target cue for a learned food source is changed experimentally, even 
modestly (cap-pushing test of Abramson et al., 2016; moved reward site of Sanderson et al., 2013; 
changed target of Abramson, 1990). These findings are relevant because M&P urge against using 
deflationary (simpler) cognitive explanations of invertebrate behaviors when more complex 
explanations are applied to vertebrates who perform the same behaviors. It is therefore 
potentially devastating when an invertebrate performs worse, opening the door for deflationary 
accounts that claim bees are not sentient but just take unconscious shortcuts to solve problems.  
Our point is that this valid counterevidence should not be ignored. We do not deny that 
the preponderance of the evidence suggests that insects are conscious. We found two studies 
that showed insect consciousness to be especially convincing (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2018, pp. 60-
62): first, the study by Fauria et al. (2000) where bees learned a complex two-part target, 
indicating that they form and recall mental images; and second, the study by Perry et al. (2016) 
where a pre-taste of a sugar reward made bees more likely to interpret ambiguous cues as leading 
to the reward — a form of optimism. These bees passed the judgement-bias test, a standard way 
of evaluating whether vertebrates have affective consciousness.  
 
3.  Why just arthropods and cephalopods? A strength of M&P’s analysis is that they attribute 
sentience and moral status only to arthropods and cephalopods among the non-vertebrates. 
Recognizing which organisms are sentient is difficult. Levy (2020) acknowledges this difficulty, 
suggesting that we should not even try but should instead assign moral status to cognition, which 
is easier to recognize. (This is rejected by M&P and Vonk, 2020.) More relevantly, Figdor (2020) 
and Veit & Huebner (2020) acknowledge the difficulty by asking why M&P draw the sentient line 
at these particular invertebrates rather than considering whether plants, bacteria, and all living 
things are sentient. Our own work on which organisms have consciousness (Feinberg and Mallatt, 
2016, 2018, 2019, 2020) suggests that M&P drew the line at the right place.  
We derived which organisms are conscious from two logical (and ultimately testable) 
assumptions. To identify the organisms with affective consciousness (Table 1), we assumed that 
emotions are revealed by the capacity for global operant learning (extensive learning from 
experience). We assumed this because this kind of learning provides double evidence of 
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emotions: (1) the initial attraction to a reward (or aversion to a punishment); and (2) the recall of 
the learned reward (or punishment) to motivate behaviors. Our criterion of global operant 
learning is similar to the Unlimited Associative Learning idea of Bronfman et al. (2016) and 
Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019).  
To identify the organisms with image-based consciousness (Table 1) — mental simulations 
of the sensed world — we assumed that any organism that constructs multisensory maps of the 
external environment and of its internal body experiences these maps consciously as mental 
reference-images for acting in the world. These maps are built from many senses and are detailed 
enough that they can aid free-living survival, growth, and reproduction in the hostile world —
capacities far beyond what any known AI or robots have.  
If we apply these two assumptions, the only sentient organisms turn out to be the mobile, 
complex-brained clades of animals, namely, all vertebrates, arthropods, and cephalopods. We 
documented both the high-capacity operant learning of these animals and the mapped neural 
pathways to their brains in our first book (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016), then added more 
documentation in our second (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2018). This reinforces M&P’s attribution of 
sentience and moral status to just these three animal clades and not to other living organisms. 
Veit & Huebner (2020), Reber (2016), and others do not think it is possible to draw such a 
definite boundary between sentient and nonsentient animals. Yet there is a definite anatomic 
boundary (rapid evolution of complex sensory organs and brains) and a definite historical jump 
as well. The fossil record shows that the definitive characteristics of consciousness (high mobility 
as well as complex sensory organs) evolved in the first arthropods and vertebrates during a 
geologically short time in the Cambrian explosion of animal diversity between 550 and 520 million 
years ago (Plotnick et al., 2010; Trestman, 2013; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016; Godfrey-Smith, 
2016). We encourage the more philosophical treatments of animal sentience to recognize this 
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